Conditionals and Mental Simulation

The next few days I will be looking over a project that started as a paper for a seminar given by Pascal Engel at the Sorbonne in 2005/06, on conditionals and mental simulation. The topics are interesting and they might occupy a significant part of my time for the next years.

Static electricity

Not really related to the issues exposed here, but an ubiquitous problem at home. The cold weather and the dry air are to blame and I search various websites for tips ro reduce the effects of this phenomenon. There was a really big spark tonight when I reached for a switch. Just wanted to get that off my mind.

Retrospective and prospective remarks

There was a considerable hiatus between my last post here and the current one, because I have been submerged in various actions having to do with my academic formation. I am currently in New York, until May 7, as a visiting scholar at the Department of Philosophy of New York University.

I am working on two articles, "Can Content Be Both Phenomenological and Externalist?", and "Cognitive Qualia and Functionalism". For the moment, I am critically reading articles on the subject and gathering some remarks on the topics. I hope to develop these into arguments in the following two weeks, in order to finish the first article until March 15. I intend to finish the second article by the end of April.

If things go well, I will be in the United States or Great Britain for the next three to five years. Let's hope this will be so.

Readings

I have just finished re-reading Dretske's Naturalizing the Mind, an interesting defense of representationism and phenomenal externalism; definitely, the last chapter contains some material on which I would like to write: Dretske's dilemma (if phenomenal experiences are thoughtlike entities, then they are externally grounded; if they are distinguished from thoughts, then one may be completely unaware of one's qualia, because qualia remain inaccessible until one acquires the conceptual resources for becoming aware of them), the Internalist Intuition (the quality of experience supervenes on the constitution, read physical constitution for materialists, of the experiencer), the supervenience on historical events and processes that shape an animal's current control circuits, and the apparent conflict between the extrinsicness of the mental and its explanatory relevance. I find Dretske's main externalist point, that experiences are not in the head (or anywhere else, for that matter, at least not necessarily) in the sense in which stories are not in the books in which they are printed, too metaphysical and irrelevant, it seems to me, with respect to research on the neural correlates of experiences. However, it would be interesting to explore more the presumed non-spatiality of conscious experiences or mental events in general (see also McGinn's ideas on the subject), although the general picture in connection to empirical research on consciousness is a skeptical one.
Other interesting remarks to reflect upon in Dretske's book are those on higher-order (experience, thought) theories of consciousness.

Ned Block will come to give a talk on The Methodological Puzzle of the Neural Basis of Phenomenal Consciousness on December the 1st. It will be a good occasion to discuss with him on the topic, and I want to write at least one good paper before his coming, for some feedback.

I continue reading Stoljar's Ignorance and Imagination, as well as Devitt's Ignorance of Language.

I read a few weeks ago Hurley's "Varieties of Externalism" paper, and I think there are some nice arguments within, in need of a riposte. I want to work on that these days, perhaps write a small paper.

Comeback

Long time, no see. Many things occurred during the interval. I obtained an M.A. in Philosophy from Paris IV, with a thesis on the phenomenal character of thought, and finished the course with appropriate French grades (minimum 17, I even got a 19). I am currently compiling an application for a PhD scholarship offered to Ecole Normale Supérieure graduates.

I got to visit Hungary (i.e. Budapest) and Japan (i.e. Tokyo) during the summer (2+2 weeks), in July and the beginning of August, with a short, one week intermezzo in Romania (Bucharest, Turnu Magurele and Sutesti). I participated at a summer school on the philosophy of physics at Central European University and at a summer school on cognitive neuroscience at the RIKEN Brain Science Institute in Wako-shi, near Tokyo. I went afterwards to Romania until the end of August and I returned to Paris on September the 1st.

If everything goes well, I will go in January to New York University, as a visiting scholar, remaining there until the beginning of May.

I have many more (and long-range) ideas about my academic career, but I keep these for me for the moment.

I started reading some fresh philosophy books, such as Devitt's "Ignorance of Language" and Stoljar's "Ignorance and Imagination". The first interests me from the point of view of the relations between language and thought (there are some new discussions on the map theory of thought as well), while the second is interesting from the point of view of phenomenal concepts and consciousness-physicalism discussions.

The topic of my PhD project is Externalism and Phenomenal Experience. I am finally making my way from work on thoughts to work on consciousness. I want to evaluate consciousness externalism, mainly in a critical vein, and propose consciousness and intentional internalism across the board, modulo intentional vehicle internalism. Intentional vehicle externalism seems plausible to me.

Perhaps I'll write with more regularity in this weblog in the coming months.

Looking to the future, activities

I started an ambitious agenda of readings and writings.
I want to go through important texts in the history of psychology, for instance. William James's "The Principles of Psychology" is a starter. For the moment, I am making my way through the text dealing with late 19th century neuroscience, but I find it fascinating and it helps me identify the main themes that got to be treated through the ages up until now.
I am also in the process of reading and analysing some of the main texts having to do with externalism. Rob Wilson's recent "Boundaries of the Mind" is an example- I read his chapter on consciousness and intentionality, where he discusses Loar, Horgan & Tienson, and Galen Strawson. He is against a phenomenology of intentionality, but I find his arguments dealable with. Putnam's classic "The Meaning of 'Meaning'" is truly a model article. I like very much the way in which he constructed it and his method of argumentation. It makes one see just how mediocre other philosophical prose is.
I have two papers to write until around the 15th of January and one presentation to make on the 11th. The papers are concerned with (i) conditionals and mental simulationist approaches and (ii) externalism. I continue to be interested in the topics of my forthcoming dissertation, consciousness and intentionality and the relations between them.
I started to download and read some seminal papers from Trends in Cognitive Sciences, on consciousness, change blindness, and other hot contemporary topics. I want to familiarize myself to a great extent with Ned Block's recent work on NCCs and with Alva Noe's enactive views on perception.
Searle's extremely clear and mind-opening introductory book on the philosophy of mind inspires me to get acquainted with classical, as well as recent work on the main topics in the field. I want to read more about emotions and evolutionary approaches to the mind, about neurobiology and genetics.
Chomsky's "New Horizons in the Study of Mind and Language" is, according to Casati, a mind-opening book as well, and I started reading it recently. I find Chomsky, just like Putnam, to be a model in his thinking and expository manner.
I count on coming back with some sketches and drafts related to my two forthcoming papers.

Cambridge, NYU, sciences sociales, simulation mentale, ordinateurs, caractère phénoménal de la pensée, cadres de référence, inscriptions

Plusieurs sujets sont sur mon agenda ces jours-ci:
(a) décisions concernant l'année 2006-2007, quand je voudrais aller à l'étranger pour y faire mes études pour la 3ème année en tant qu'étudiant de l'ENS- NYU serait ma première option, car le département est très bon en philosophie de l'esprit, Cambridge ma deuxième et Oxford ma troisième option; demain je me rencontrerai avec Francis Wolff, le directeur du Département de Philosophie de l'ENS pour voir si on pourrait mettre en place un accord explicit entre l'ENS et NYU concernant les échanges; sinon, j'aimerais aller à Cambridge, pour travailler avec Simon Blackburn ou Jane Heal dans le cadre d'un (oui, encore un) MPhil (MasterBoy will be my nickname);
(b) je dois faire une présentation au séminaire de Daniel Andler sur les sciences sociales et les sciences cognitives- il s'agit du texte célébre de Tooby et Cosmides, "The Psychological Foundations of Culture"; je travaillerai également pour un site web du cours et un weblog;
(c) je me suis décidé d'écrire mon mini-mémoire pour le cours sur les conditionnels de Pascal Engel à la Sorbonne sur les débats concernant la simulation mentale- Jane Heal a quelques pages dans son "Co-Cognition and Off-Line Simulation: Two Ways of
Understanding the Simulation Approach" sur les conditionnels en relation avec la simulation mentale, en faisant une critique de Nichols et Stich sur la connaissance des jugements conditionnels impliquant des inférences méta-linguistiques; je parlerai avec Pascal Engel aujourd'hui sur ce sujet;
(d) une conférence à Le Mans qui aura lieu l'année prochaine en mai, sur les ordinateurs et la philosophie, avec la participation de Dennett, Brooks, Boden et al.; il faudra envoyer un résumé étendu de 1000 mots jusqu'à vendredi;
(e) date-limite demain pour le papier sur le caractère phénoménal de la pensée consciente et inconsciente, à envoyer à Budapest- bonne préparation pour le mémoire de master (des modifications éventuelles du résumé pour TSC 2006 sont également possibles);
(f) atelier sur les cadres de référence dans la cognition spatiale, à commencer ce jeudi, avec la présence de Pylyshyn et Barbara Tversky;
(g) programme d'études 2005-2006 à l'ENS et inscriptions à la Sorbonne.
etc.

Pensée inconsciente

J'ai ressenti une certaine propensité vers le travail intellectuel pur ce dernier jour et j'aimerais continuer dans cet état d'esprit. Je voudrais mettre au point mon essai pour la conférence de Budapest, sur le caractère phénoménal de la pensée consciente et inconsciente (3+3p.) La partie dure sera la deuxième, dans laquelle j'essaierai de développer un argument pour la thèse selon laquelle meme la pensée inconsciente est caractérisée par des propriétés phénoménales. Une question adjacente importante concerne le caractère phénoménal de la perception inconsciente. Dans le cas de la vision aveugle (blindsight), pourrait-on avoir des éléments informationnels inaccesibles à la conscience mais néanmoins phénoménales, dans le sens de potentiellement expérimentables d'une façon phénoménale, impliquant une manière de sembler au sujet expérientiel? Si on utilisait des dispositifs capables de récupérer des informations stockées inconsciemment, serait-on dans une situation semblable avec la situation dans laquelle les memes informations seraient disponibles dès le début dans la conscience d'un sujet? Il faudra relire Jackendoff et Carruthers d'une manière étendue, car j'ai seulement une semaine restante à ma disposition. Surtout, il va falloir écrire d'une façon analytique, claire et précise, mais profonde et originelle en meme temps.